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Papua New Guinea is embedded in a regional strategic order dominated by the United States 
and Australia.  The Government of Papua New Guinea recognises the country’s security 
shortcomings and is taking action to remedy them.  It plans to more than double the size of the 
PNG Defence Force to 5,000 regular and reserve personnel by 2017.  The core tasks of the 
PNG Defence Force are to defend PNG against attack and maintain the integrity of its sovereign 
land, air and maritime borders; to provide civil emergency assistance in security, humanitarian 
and disaster relief; to engage in nation building; and to participate in international operations in 
both war zones and humanitarian operations.  PNG is now sending peacekeepers to UN 
operations in Sudan and South Sudan.  Regionally, the PNGDF has emerged with a good 
reputation after ten years with the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands.  Borders 
present problems.  Both the PNG-Indonesia border and the PNG-Australia border require 
continuing bilateral cooperation.  The Pan-Melanesianism of the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
poses difficulties for PNG in its relations with Indonesia.  Australia matters most as a defence 
partner for PNG, but the Manus asylum seeker processing centre is undermining Australia’s 
advocacy of maintaining high standards in delivering security.  The military mood is buoyant in 
PNG, but PNG’s security problems are fundamentally developmental and political and will not 
be solved quickly.  
Like other Pacific Island countries, Papua New Guinea is embedded in a 
regional strategic order that remains unchanged almost seventy years after 
the end of World War II.  The United States is predominant militarily, 
supported by a string of military alliances with Australia, Korea, Japan and 
the Philippines.  American military bases stretch from Hawai’i to Guam, 
Japan and Korea and American forces rotate through northern Australia.  
Papua New Guinea, which consisted of two bordering Australian territories in 
World War II, both invaded by Japan, has been independent for nearly forty 
years and looks to Australia and the United States for its strategic security.  
The Joint Declaration of Principles of 1987 requires Australia and PNG to 
“consult about matters affecting their common security in the event of 
external armed attack threatening the national sovereignty of either country” 
and is interpreted on both sides as an undertaking, falling somewhat short of 
a cast-iron guarantee, that Australia would come to the defence of PNG.
1
  
Under the security provisions of the Joint Declaration for a New Papua New 
Guinea-Australia Partnership, signed in 2013, bilateral defence relations will 
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deepen and Australia will do more to strengthen the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force (PNGDF).  
A stable and enduring Pacific strategic order is accompanied by a fast 
changing economic order as the shift of global production to East Asia 
creates new opportunities for Pacific Island countries, and especially for 
resource-rich PNG.  In the last decade PNG’s economy—as traditional 
economics measures these things—has grown consistently at rates more 
like those of East Asia than of the neighbouring Pacific Islands.  A 
consortium of companies led by ExxonMobil’s PNG LNG is spending US $19 
billion on the construction phase of the project, and is exporting liquefied 
natural gas to Japan, China and Taiwan, creating unprecedented growth 
potential.  China, though not the largest foreign investor, is growing in 
importance to PNG as a market and source of investment.  The most 
important Chinese investment in the Pacific region is Ramu NiCo, which 
mines nickel, cobalt and chromite near Madang, Papua New Guinea, and 
has built a refinery on the coast at Basamuk Bay.  Ramu NiCo expects to 
export these minerals for the next twenty years.  
Like many other countries in the Asia-Pacific, PNG confronts a potential 
future mismatch between its strategic ties to the United States and its 
economic ties to China.  PNG’s 2013 Defence White Paper points out that 
the United States is still “the pre-eminent global economic and military power 
and will continue to be so for years to come”, yet at the same time China’s 
“rise to the second largest economy on earth continues to have an upward 
trajectory and is matched by its growing influence around the world”.  PNG 
“is a friend to both countries, has traditional security links with the United 
States and developing relations with China”.
2
 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
The PNGDF is small even for a small country, with about 2,000 personnel in 
its land, maritime and air elements.  With Australian assistance, the 
Government of PNG halved PNGDF numbers from about 4,000 to 2,000 
after 2002, following a series of incidents arising from serious lack of 
discipline, including a mutiny at Moem Barracks in Wewak, where buildings 
were burnt down and soldiers had to be arrested.  In recent years, the LNG 
boom has added to recruitment problems by attracting officers and soldiers 
to higher paying jobs in the private sector.  The restructuring of the PNGDF, 
however, had useful consequences.  The presence of soldiers in Southern 
Highlands Province in 2007, for example, ensured that the elections would 
proceed rather than fail as happened in 2002, and members of the PNGDF 
gained a good reputation for their performance during the ten years of their 
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military presence of the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands 
2003-2013.  
The Government of PNG has now taken a further step and produced the 
country’s first ever National Security Policy together with the first Defence 
White Paper since 1999.  Speaking at the launch of the two papers in 2013, 
Prime Minister Peter O’Neill conceded that PNG’s national security had  
lacked cohesion and effective coordination since Independence.  Our 
response to security issues have been largely disjointed as a result.  Our 
national security institutions have been neglected to the extent where they 
lack appropriate capabilities to provide effective public safety and protection 
of our natural resources and our international borders.  But we must not sit 
back and languish, and blame others for what we have not done.  My 
Government is committed to addressing and improving our security.  The 
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary’s Modernisation Program and the 
PNG Defence White Paper 2013 are examples of the work we are putting in 
improving this sector.
3
 
The government proposes to more than double the size of the PNGDF, from 
2,000 to 4,000 regular personnel and 1,000 reserves by 2017, with a further 
doubling to 10,000 by 2030.
4
  
According to the White Paper, the core tasks of the PNGDF are to defend 
PNG against attack and maintain the integrity of its sovereign land, air and 
maritime borders; to provide civil emergency assistance in security, 
humanitarian and disaster relief; to engage in nation building; and to 
participate in international operations in both war zones and humanitarian 
operations.  
Let us examine these core tasks one by one.  The capacity of PNG’s 
security agencies “has declined considerably” since independence, 
according to the Defence White Paper,  
causing significant security gaps along our land, air and maritime borders.  
Porous and uncontrolled borders have allowed transnational crime such as 
the illegal smuggling of small arms, light weapons and contraband to 
continue unabated.
5
  
Poor border control also permits the plundering of the country’s fish stocks 
and timber “at an alarming rate”.
6
  For this reason, controlling the borders 
requires that the PNGDF be modernised and revitalised.  
The Defence White Paper is right to point to the difficulties of policing PNG’s 
vast maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which is 3.1 million square 
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kilometres in extent and includes seven maritime borders.  One estimate is 
that PNG loses one billion kina (AUD $500 million) annually in fishing 
revenue as a result of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in this 
zone.
7
  Like other Pacific countries, PNG has used Pacific Patrol Boats 
donated by Australia to police its EEZ, and will do so in the future now that 
Australia has announced the Pacific Maritime Security Program, which aims 
to provide an updated version of the patrol boat program from 2018.  Under 
the old scheme, Australia funded refits of the boats and brought crews to the 
Australian Maritime College for training, as well as supplying Navy personnel 
as advisers.  Under the new program, Pacific EEZ surveillance might be 
directed by a regional maritime coordination centre based in Solomon 
Islands, but whatever form it takes, PNG’s ageing patrol boats will be 
replaced.  The task of EEZ surveillance and enforcement is best performed 
regionally and with the support of powerful allies, as happens annually in the 
Forum Fisheries Agency’s Operation Kurukuru, a coordinated maritime 
operation covering the exclusive economic zones of fifteen Pacific countries 
including PNG.  Vessels and aircraft of the Quadrilateral Defence Partner 
countries (Australia, New Zealand, France and the United States) provide 
robust support to Pacific patrol boats in the search for poachers.  In 2013 the 
Operation covered 30 million square kilometres, included PNG’s EEZ, and 
involved twelve Pacific patrol boats, whose crews participated in boarding 
more than 100 fishing vessels.
8
  
Alone among Pacific Island countries, PNG has a land border.  Originating in 
the colonial partition of the island of New Guinea between the Netherlands, 
Germany and Great Britain in the nineteenth century, the border was 
inherited by Indonesia when it assumed control of west New Guinea from the 
Dutch in 1963 and became the dividing line, 760 km long, between 
Indonesia and the new state of PNG in 1975.  Since then the border has 
been the occasion of numerous minor disputes between the two countries 
and a major one in the mid-1980s, when thousands of West Papuans fled 
into PNG as refugees following a crackdown by Indonesian military forces on 
West Papuan independence activists.  By 1986 as many as 12,000 West 
Papuans had crossed into PNG seeking refuge, and soon afterwards PNG 
and Indonesia signed a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Cooperation, and 
Friendship, agreeing to "avoid, reduce and contain disputes or conflicts 
between their nations and settle any differences that may arise only by 
peaceful means" (Article 2), and promising not to threaten or use force 
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against each other (Article 7).
9
  Observers were unsure whether the treaty 
added anything to the security of the border, but by the early 1990s PNG 
and Indonesia had signed a “status of forces” agreement.  
Further border agreements have followed, in 1990, 1992, 2003, and most 
recently in 2013, when PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill led a delegation of 
ministers to Jakarta seeking an improvement in bilateral relations.  Both 
sides agreed on softer border management after PNG closed the border 
crossing near Jayapura for three weeks.
10
  Smugglers have for years 
brought guns and ammunition from Indonesia across the border, landing 
them on the beaches at Vanimo before they are taken further into PNG, 
especially the Highlands.  Political violence persists.  Militants of the 
separatist Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM, who seek an independent 
West Papua, continue to attack Indonesian targets.  In April 2014, for 
example, a group of about thirty separatists removed the Indonesian flag in 
favour of the Bintang Kejora or Morning Star flag, symbol of West Papuan 
independence, and destroyed government property at the border near 
Jayapura.  Indonesian soldiers were reported to have killed three protesters 
in a shoot-out which lasted for hours, and the Indonesian authorities then 
closed the border gate at Skouw-Wutung after West Papuans fled into 
PNG.
11
  As in 2013, the border remained closed for weeks, and even after it 
was opened again, the PNGDF was preventing PNG citizens from crossing 
into Indonesia on the grounds that OPM activists posed a security problem.
12
  
The maritime border between PNG and Australia leaves the Torres Strait 
islands in Australian territory.  Some, such as Saibai, are only a few 
kilometres from the PNG coast, and under the 1978 Torres Strait Treaty, 
which came into effect in 1985, PNG citizens from thirteen nominated 
villages may make traditional visits to what is called the Torres Strait 
Protected Zone, which extends to 10 degrees 30 minutes south latitude in 
Australian territory.  Tens of thousands of Papua New Guineans take up this 
opportunity each year, and PNG Customs, Immigration and Police personnel 
regularly conduct joint border patrols with Australian Customs and Border 
Security, Australian Federal Police and Queensland Police in the search for 
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illegal movement of guns, drugs and money, as well as for vessels engaging 
in illegal fishing.
13
  
The border raises issues not just of smuggling and people movement, but 
also of human security in the form of threats to health.  For years Papua 
New Guineans made the short trip to the Australian islands of Saibai and 
Boigu in order to receive treatment for tuberculosis (TB), a serious health 
problem in PNG, where the prevalence rate—534 per 100,000 people in 
2011—is high by global standards and very high by Pacific standards.  At 
that time the Australian health clinics were treating sixty PNG nationals for 
TB, some with the multi-drug-resistant form of the disease.  The Australian 
and Queensland governments have since closed the clinics to Papua New 
Guinean patients, opting instead to strengthen the health system on the 
PNG side of the border.  Daru Hospital opened a new TB isolation ward in 
2013, and Australia is funding World Vision to train community-based health 
workers, as well as providing a sea ambulance and boats for health service 
access to the South Fly District.  A visiting World Health Organization team 
found evidence in 2012 of better diagnosis, training and infection control as a 
result of these new measures,
14
 but not everyone is convinced that the 
change in arrangements is for the better, given PNG’s patchy record in 
delivering health services in rural areas.  Following criticism of the closure of 
the Australian clinics to Papua New Guineans, the Queensland Department 
of Health claimed that:  
any re-opening of the Saibai and Boigu island tuberculosis clinics for Papua 
New Guinea nationals is likely to increase the risk of cross-border infection 
for the Torres Strait.  It would also increase the risk of drug-resistant 
tuberculosis (TB) entering Queensland.  A locally-controlled program, as 
endorsed by the World Health Organization, is the most effective method of 
combating TB in PNG.
15
  
The security of Australia, as the TB issue shows, depends in part on the 
success of PNG as a developing state and on the effectiveness of its public 
health system.  
As happens in the case of the Torres Strait, people move back and forth 
across the border on PNG’s north-eastern flank between Bougainville and 
Solomon Islands.  During the armed conflict in Bougainville in the 1990s, 
hundreds of Bougainvilleans found refuge in Choiseul Province and some 
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took guns with them, adding to the store of firearms later used during the 
tensions in Solomon Islands.  But since the end of hostilities on Bougainville 
more than fifteen years ago, the border has reverted to its role as a peaceful 
and artificial dividing line between related communities.  Solomon Islands 
has now built a border post at Taro Island, Choiseul Province, and there is 
talk of establishing two border control posts on Bougainville.
16
  
The second core task of the PNGDF is to provide civil emergency assistance 
in security, humanitarian and disaster relief, and the Defence White Paper 
envisages the PNGDF developing its capabilities as a first responder to 
disasters and to acts of “terrorism, piracy, sabotage, hostage and hijack”.
17
  
All of this is unexceptionable while at the same raising the key issue of 
affordability inherent in the ambitions of the White Paper in general.  
The third core task is to engage in nation-building and contribute to national 
development, including providing security for national elections as in 2007 
and 2012, and creating a secure environment for the South Pacific Defence 
Ministers’ Meeting in 2014, the Pacific Games in 2015 and APEC in 2018.  
APEC is a huge international event that tests the capabilities of much larger 
countries and will certainly test those of PNG.  The broader aim is to 
“develop PNGDF capabilities in Engineering, Health, Signals, the ability to 
provide government patrols into ‘inaccessible’ terrain as well as Land, 
Maritime and Air mobility platforms to contribute to nation building”.  The 
Defence Organisation will “assist with relieving the national ‘Youth Bulge’ 
problem by building the Reserve Force, introducing the school cadet system 
and developing a National Service scheme”.
18
  
The idea that the PNGDF should engage in nation-building is not new and 
has not been successful in the past.  As the former Australian Parliamentary 
Secretary for Defence David Feeney pointed out in 2013,  
PNG tried ‘security-for-development’ approaches with only mixed success in 
the early to mid-1990s.  And, some would argue the tide-of-history suggests 
the great success stories of our day, such as Indonesia, are all moving to 
reduce their militaries’ day-to-day involvement in internal security, 
governance and the market.
19
  
An expanded nation-building role for the PNGDF, especially a bigger 
PNGDF, might tempt it to adopt a directly political role, as happened briefly 
in 2012 when a small group of soldiers arrested the force commander in 
support of Sir Michael Somare’s attempt to regain the prime ministership.  
The Sandline affair in 1997, when the PNGDF seized a group of 
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mercenaries imported by the government, was another case of minor mutiny, 
but for the most part the force has been loyal to the civil power since 
independence.  
The fourth core task of the PNGDF, according to the new Defence White 
Paper, is to fulfil its international obligations regionally and in UN 
peacekeeping operations.  The Government of PNG amended the Defence 
Act in 2010 to make deployment of PNGDF soldiers possible beyond the 
Pacific region, and PNG has since sent military observers to Dafur and 
South Sudan.  The numbers are small—just four PNG military observers in 
mid-2013, with plans to double that number—compared with those from Fiji, 
which has been sending its soldiers to UN and multilateral peacekeeping 
operations since the late 1970s.  Fiji has 600 peacekeepers in the UN 
Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights border between Israel 
and Syria, and an infantry battalion with the Multinational Force and 
Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, where the Fijians monitor three major border 
crossings between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.  Nothing on this scale yet 
exists in the case of the PNGDF, but the initiative in Sudan and South Sudan 
points to the PNG’s ambitions to follow the Fiji example.  For Fiji as for PNG, 
participation in UN peacekeeping not only offers the prospect of financial 
compensation by the UN, but also the chance to operate on a world stage 
alongside the military forces of much larger states.  
The Defence White Paper speaks of the PNGDF’s readiness to participate 
“in the security components” of the Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group, the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting, and even 
the Association of South East Asian Nations, where PNG has had special 
observer status since 1981.
20
  
The most important ‘security component’ of the Pacific Islands Forum in 
recent years, has been the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI), where PNGDF personnel served alongside Australian, New 
Zealand, Tongan (and for a while Fijian) troops.  They were farewelled in 
Honiara in April 2013, having brought knowledge of Melanesian pidgin and a 
cultural familiarity that gave them easy access to Solomon Islands 
communities and smoothed the way for RAMSI’s police and civilians.  The 
performance of the platoons rotated regularly through Solomon Islands 
earned respect of a kind that was new to the PNGDF.   
The regional statement of principles that provided justification for RAMSI is 
the Biketawa Declaration, signed by PNG and all other Forum states in 
2000.  The Declaration, drawn up a few months after a coup in Fiji and the 
forcible removal of a government in Solomon Islands, commits Forum 
countries to certain motherhood principles, beginning with good governance 
and including “belief in the liberty of the individual under the law” and “the 
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peaceful transfer of power, the rule of law and the independence of the 
judiciary, just and honest government”.  More importantly, the Declaration 
recognises “the vulnerability of member countries to threats to their security, 
broadly defined, and the importance of cooperation among members in 
dealing with such threats when they arise” and provides for graduated steps 
that the Forum might take in response “in time of crisis” in a member state.  
The Declaration did not specify armed intervention of the kind that transpired 
in Solomon Islands in 2003, but provided for consultation by Forum ministers 
and “targeted measures”, and when the time came its language was general 
enough to provide legal cover for the regional intervention.
21
 Regional 
security in the Pacific implies the internal security of Pacific states, not only 
in Solomon Islands but also in its far larger neighbour PNG.  
Internal Security Issues and the Police 
By some measures PNG has experienced more serious and more persistent 
security crises than Solomon Islands.  Whereas perhaps 200 people were 
killed during the Solomon Islands tensions, many more—thousands in all—
were losing their lives in violent conflict in those parts of PNG that lay largely 
beyond the pale of government authority, such as Southern Highlands 
Province in the decade from about 2000.  Tribal fighting remains common in 
some parts of the Highlands.  It was reported in February 2014, for example, 
that:  
thousands of people living between the Chimbu-Jiwaka borders all the way 
to Minj have been missing out on vital government services for years due to 
constant tribal fighting.  Just two weeks after leaders in the area promised to 
stop fighting and other crimes in front of Supt Tondop, a fight erupted 
between the Golukup and Tulmukup tribes which resulted in the death of 
four people and massive destruction to property.
22
  
The Government of PNG, however, has never defined such conflict and loss 
of life as a security crisis of the kind that might invoke the regional 
protections of the Biketawa Declaration, nor have they asked the Pacific 
Islands Forum for security assistance.  
In those cases where PNG has accepted help with security, it has been for 
the country’s urban centres, directed at establishing conditions of law and 
order in PNG’s capital, Port Moresby, and in towns such as Lae.  The 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s liveability ranking of cities placed Port Moresby 
in the worst ten in 2013, along with Harare, Lagos and Dhaka.
23
  Security 
companies thrive in Port Moresby and elsewhere in PNG because they 
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provide the conditions of personal safety that police do not deliver.  All sorts 
of daily tasks in Port Moresby can be unsafe for people to undertake, from 
catching the bus to buying goods at a market, filling a car with petrol or 
getting back to a settlement after dark.  
Recognising this situation, PNG agreed to take a Police Assistance Package 
from Australia in 2004, with the aim of putting more than 200 police on the 
streets of Port Moresby and assisting with criminal investigations.  The first 
Australian police, based at Gordon Police Station in Port Moresby, began 
street patrols in December 2004, but the entire Australian contingent 
withdrew in May 2005 after the PNG Supreme Court ruled the deployment 
unconstitutional.  At issue was the legal immunity of Australian police in 
PNG, seen as a slight to the country’s sovereignty, although the PNGDF 
were accepting similar immunity for their own soldiers in Solomon Islands at 
the same time.  The episode revealed the potential for initiatives of this kind 
to produce a nationalist backlash against Australia.  Bilateral relations 
between Australia and PNG were strained in the last years of the Howard 
Government, but the election of the Rudd Government in 2007 put police 
cooperation back on the agenda, and led to the inauguration of the PNG-
Australia Policing Partnership the following year.  The Partnership is now in 
Phase IV, and a new generation of AFP officers has been deployed to PNG, 
arriving in late 2013.  Unlike their predecessors a decade ago, they do not 
have direct policing powers, although they accompany Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) officers on foot and vehicle patrols both in 
Port Moresby and Lae.  Their task is to guide and assist the RPNGC in a 
wide range of areas from community policing to managing police stations, 
controlling traffic, conducting criminal investigations and dealing with sexual 
offences.
24
 The paramilitary police mobile squads in PNG have gained a 
reputation for harshness, even brutality, and it would be in Australia’s 
interest, as well as PNG’s, to use the Policing Partnership now and in the 
future to curb those tendencies.  
Sub-Regional Security: the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
PNG is the largest member state of the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG), a sub-regional body that originated in pan-Melanesian sentiments of 
the 1980s, when PNG, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and to a lesser extent Fiji 
were expressing solidarity with the independence movement in New 
Caledonia and its struggle against French colonial rule.  Membership of the 
MSG therefore consists not only of states—the four Melanesian ones—but 
also of a political party, the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS).  In fact the present MSG chair, Victor Tutugoro, is a member of the 
FLNKS.  Frank Bainimarama’s 2006 coup isolated Fiji, especially when he 
failed to hold promised elections in 2009.  Fiji was suspended from the 
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Pacific Islands Forum, and Bainimarama turned his diplomatic energies 
elsewhere, becoming chair of the MSG in 2011 and investing it with a new 
significance.  In recent years the MSG has pursued an active sub-regional 
agenda, including further trade liberalisation under the MSG Trade 
Agreement, a Melanesian Green Climate Fund and a Skills Movement 
Scheme (SMS), which is designed to allow 400 skilled Melanesians—
nurses, doctors, engineers, accountants and other professionals—to move 
freely from one MSG country to another.  According to MSG Secretary-
General Peter Forau, the scheme offers “preferential treatment to parties in 
the MSG SMS to access employment opportunities” and has the additional 
benefit of providing a framework of accreditation and standards that “will 
prepare the MSG members to tap into the wider international labour market 
where there are more relatively lucrative opportunities”.
25
 In other words, 
Forau sees skilled labour mobility between Melanesian countries as a 
stepping stone for Pacific Islanders to the labour markets of Australia, New 
Zealand and other advanced economies.  
As MSG Chair, Bainimarama wanted to expand the role of the organisation 
beyond trade, labour and environmental arrangements to regional and 
international security.  He pushed for the MSG to set up its own Melanesian 
peacekeeping unit, which would be offered to the UN worldwide, and 
initiated the creation of a department of peacekeeping operations at the 
MSG Secretariat.  Any peacekeeping unit of this kind, if it were to eventuate, 
would almost certainly be organised and led by the peacekeeping specialists 
of the Pacific, the Fijians, rather than by PNG.  
Pan-Melanesianism has its complications for PNG.  At its 2013 meeting, the 
MSG had to decide on an application for membership from the West Papua 
National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), which seeks the independence of 
West Papua from Indonesia.  The MSG endorsed “the inalienable rights of 
the people of West Papua towards self-determination as provided for under 
the preamble of the MSG constitution” and that “the concerns of the MSG 
regarding the human rights violations and other forms of atrocities relating to 
the West Papuan people be raised with the Government of Indonesia 
bilaterally and as a Group”.
26
  On the question of membership by the 
WPNCL, it was decided to investigate the issue further by accepting 
Indonesia’s invitation to host a fact-finding visit to West Papua by 
Melanesian foreign ministers.  PNG’s deputy Prime Minister Leo Dion, in the 
absence of Peter O’Neill, made clear that his country sees West Papua as 
an integral part of Indonesia and does not support its independence.  He 
could hardly say anything else, given PNG’s long-standing acceptance of the 
integrity and permanence of Indonesia’s border on the island of New Guinea.  
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When the MSG ministers went to West Papua in January 2014, sparking a 
demonstration and a number of arrests, Vanuatu boycotted the mission, 
claiming Fiji had transformed it from a human rights delegation into a trade 
and investment initiative.  Indonesia joined the MSG as an observer in 2011, 
and its policy of soft engagement on West Papua replaces one of rigid 
exclusion, which for many years made official visits of this kind impossible.  
As an observer, Indonesia is able to bring to MSG meetings anti-
independence West Papuans such as Franzalbert Joku, who told the 
journalist Sean Dorney at the 2013 MSG meeting that the human rights 
situation in Indonesia had “improved markedly since the process of reforms 
and democratisation were introduced at the end of the '90s.  And that is also 
reflected in the situation in [the Indonesian province of] Papua.”
27
  Indonesia, 
which has been increasing its engagement with PNG and other Pacific 
countries in recent years, could be well satisfied with the outcome of the 
2014 West Papua mission.  In a joint statement issued in Jakarta after the 
West Papua visit, Indonesia and the MSG declared that they supported “our 
respective sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and the principle of non-
interference in each other’s affairs, consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations”, adding that they also backed PNG’s chairmanship of APEC in 
2018.
28
 
Diplomatic and Defence Partners 
The LNG boom and the steady expansion of the PNG economy in recent 
years has given the country a new confidence internationally.  PNG currently 
has three diplomatic missions in Australia, two in the United States and 
Indonesia, and one each in New Zealand, Singapore, Japan, Fiji, the 
Solomon Islands, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, India, the United 
Kingdom and Belgium.  The government plans to add further missions in Tel 
Aviv and Paris, to place a second China mission in Shanghai and to open 
offices in Germany and Vietnam.  Israel has been increasingly active in the 
Pacific Islands, spurred perhaps by the emergence of the United Arab 
Emirates as an aid donor and diplomatic partner to Pacific countries since 
2010.  Ties between PNG and Israel are not new, but Peter O’Neill was the 
first PNG prime minister to make an official visit to Israel, when he held talks 
with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2013 and signed an 
Israel-PNG Joint Declaration of Cooperation.  Mr Netanyahu specifically 
offered PNG assistance “for defence, security and intelligence training” as 
well as for agriculture and capacity building, and in an accompanying 
bilateral defence cooperation agreement that was to be signed later, Israel 
will provide training for PNGDF personnel and police in advance of the 
APEC meeting in PNG in 2018.  Speaking in Jerusalem, O’Neill said:  
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We are going to send some people over, especially instructors from 
Bomana police college, Goldie River training depot and Igam Barracks, and 
also from the police special protection units, to upgrade their skills to provide 
better protection of leaders who will visit us.
29
  
Israel is only one among a number of countries with which PNG has security 
links.  PNG has defence agreements with the United States and New 
Zealand, and defence relations on a small scale with Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Fiji.  After meeting his Chinese counterpart, General Liang 
Guanglie, in Beijing in 2013, PNG Defence Minister Fabian Pok revealed 
that the PNGDF would benefit from a US $2 million dollar grant from China, 
and said it would be spent on armoured cars, troop carriers and uniforms, as 
well as maintaining swimming pools and gymnasiums at PNGDF barracks.  
Pok was quoted as saying China did not want to be seen as becoming too 
involved in PNG military issues.
30
  The United States has responded.  In 
2014 US Pacific Naval Commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear III held talks 
with Prime Minister Peter O’Neill in Port Moresby.  He confirmed that the US 
Army would engage in a new training scheme for PNGDF soldiers, and 
promised US naval support for security at the APEC meeting.
31
  
Australia, though, is the defence partner that really matters for PNG.  On her 
visit to PNG in 2013 Julia Gillard joined Peter O’Neill in signing the Joint 
Declaration for a New Papua New Guinea-Australia Partnership, which 
includes a commitment to strengthen the “enduring defence relationship” 
between the two countries and deepen bilateral cooperation on maritime and 
border security, regional peacekeeping and disaster relief.  In financial terms 
these words mean that Australia will spend more on its defence cooperation 
program with PNG, already its largest with any country and boosted 
significantly to AUD $27 million in 2013-14.
32
  The extra funds over the 
coming years will pay for more Australian Defence Force officers to be 
deployed to Port Moresby, where they will work alongside their PNGDF 
counterparts as advisers and trainers at a time when the force plans on rapid 
expansion.  The new emphasis on the defence relationship was underscored 
at the first bilateral defence ministers’ meeting between the two countries in 
Canberra in December 2011, when they agreed on an annual PNG-Australia 
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security dialogue involving senior defence and foreign affairs officials.  PNG 
was represented at the inaugural South Pacific Defence Ministers’ meeting 
in Tonga in 2013, and will host the 2014 meeting.  
Asylum seekers complicate the PNG-Australia security relationship.  The 
Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island was built in 2001, closed 
in 2008, and then re-opened in November 2012 as the Australian 
Government sought to discourage the flow of potential refugees south from 
Indonesia.  Australia announced on 19 July 2013 that henceforth all asylum 
seekers reaching Australian territory would be resettled in PNG or some 
other participating regional country.  Under a bilateral Regional Resettlement 
Arrangement, PNG agreed—for an initial period of twelve months—to accept 
such people for processing, and if they proved to be refugees, to resettle 
them.  Peter O’Neill wavered on this promise in 2014, suggesting that other 
Pacific countries should bear some of the burden of resettlement, but soon 
changed course and agreed that PNG would settle them all.
33
  A major riot in 
the Manus processing centre in February 2014 left one asylum seeker dead, 
and pointed to major failures in management.  The incident was emblematic 
of security problems in many parts of PNG: security was in the hands of a 
private security company, G4S, the PNG police lacked control over the 
situation, and the consequence was human rights abuse.  As an Amnesty 
International Report of December 2013 pointed out, the regional 
resettlement arrangement has led to abuses of human rights while doing 
little for PNG:  
Papua New Guinea has thus far seen no significant transfer of expertise or 
other material benefit from Australian immigration officials, medical staff, 
caseworkers, security staff, or other professionals.  Papua New Guinea 
authorities remain dependent on their Australian counterparts for virtually 
every aspect of the administration and day-to-day operation of both the 
detention centre and the Refugee Status Determination process.
34
   
Australia, while compensating PNG for hosting the processing centre, is 
undermining its own reputation for humanitarian treatment of potential 
refugees, and undercutting its advocacy of maintaining high standards in 
delivering security by disciplined forces in PNG.  
The Developmental Roots of PNG’s Security Problem 
The military mood in PNG is buoyant.  Speaking at the officers’ mess in Port 
Moresby in 2014, PNGDF chief of logistics Colonel Carl Wrakonei 
emphasised that PNG would be implementing the Defence White Paper and 
increasing the size of the force.  He was quoted as saying that the PNGDF 
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would be more than 5,000 in strength by 2015 and 10,000 by 2030.
35
  These 
are unrealistic predictions that belie the reality of the challenges facing the 
PNGDF.  Indiscipline has been a problem in the past and remains so.  In 
July 2013, after a minor argument between medical students and PNGDF 
personnel over access to an ATM, soldiers returned with bush knives and 
firearms to the University of Papua New Guinea medical faculty, where they 
fired on students and destroyed accommodation and property, including 
laptops and textbooks.  Soldiers seriously injured one student.
36
  A further 
incident followed in February 2014 near Merauke in the Indonesian province 
of Papua.  A PNG military patrol intercepted an Indonesian fishing boat on its 
way to a village in PNG, stopped it at gunpoint and, after robbing the 
fishermen, left them to swim ashore while the boat was set alight.  Five 
fishermen disappeared before reaching shore, and Jakarta reacted by 
sending more marines to Merauke together with a naval frigate to search for 
the men.  Indonesia demanded an explanation from PNG.
37
  The incident 
was almost certainly criminal rather than political in origin and therefore 
unlikely to disturb PNG- Indonesian relations, but it pointed to a persistent 
lack of discipline and esprit de corps in the PNGDF.  Apart from anything 
else, the expanding PNGDF will need to focus on lines of authority and the 
responsible exercise of discipline.  
A further qualification to this analysis is recognised by the Government of 
PNG itself, which issued the country’s first National Security Statement 
alongside the new Defence White Paper.  The National Security Statement 
ranked the security threats to PNG “in order of their imminence or likely 
occurrence and their seriousness when they do occur”.  Those threats 
identified as Level One, and therefore requiring “the highest state of 
preparedness, alertness and response” were, listed in order of importance,  
untenable Law and Order; graft and corruption; human rights abuses and 
gender based violence; lack of border control; natural disasters and climate 
change; small arms and light weapons trafficking and proliferation; illegal 
poaching of resources; drug, alcohol and substance abuse; microbial 
attacks on plant, animal and human lives; and medical emergencies 
including HIV & AIDS, TB and Malaria.
38
  
The list of threats and their order of priority points to the fundamentally 
developmental and political character of PNG’s security problem, and the 
need for what the National Security Statement calls a whole-of-nation 
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approach to address it.  As the PNG Defence White Paper says, “PNG’s 
current and future security challenges are complex, non-traditional and 
predominantly developmental in nature”.
39
  A bigger, better equipped and 
more tightly disciplined PNGDF would contribute to a security solution for 
PNG but only in certain areas such as border control, light weapons 
proliferation, security for major events and effective surveillance of the 
country’s EEZ.  At the same time, participation in regional and global 
peacekeeping has the potential to enhance PNG’s international reputation.  
But as the Government of PNG recognises, much else is needed, including a 
better trained and equipped police force, and a rescue mission for the health 
system.  
To discuss security in PNG, then, is to be driven back to a consideration of 
the political system in that country.  PNG ranked 157th out of 187 countries 
in the 2014 UN Human Development Index, a rough but not grossly 
misleading guide to the state of development measured by life expectancy, 
education and GNI per capita.
40
  PNG is a country where planning trumps 
implementation, and where statements of policy and white papers promise 
more than is delivered.  The reasons for this situation have been canvassed 
on many occasions: PNG is linguistically diverse, its identities are 
fragmented, its geography poses difficulties for delivering services, it gained 
independence with only a small educated elite, its public administration is 
inefficient, and its culture has transformed the Westminster system inherited 
from Australia into something distinctively Melanesian, characterised by a 
particularist and kin-based understanding of political loyalties and an all-
encompassing network of inescapable obligations.  The consequence is that 
PNG parliaments are good at forming (and re-forming) the executive in a 
rough-and-tumble process of political deals, but much less effective in 
holding the government accountable and representing voters, that is to say, 
good at power but poor at doing something developmental with it.
41
  
Australia’s aid to PNG under what foreign minister Julie Bishop calls the 
“new paradigm”, is likely to emphasise the empowerment of women.  “Every 
time I visit PNG”, she told a business audience in Cairns in 2014,  
I meet energetic, talented, creative women and girls—women in leadership 
positions, guiding their communities, advocating, acting as role models, 
getting things done—but we need more of them.  Girls who want to learn but 
who need opportunities, and mentoring and more role models.  I aim to work 
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even more closely with PNG to help combat violence against women and 
girls so that they can make their contribution to the economy and society in 
a safe and secure environment—free from fear and free from violence and 
intimidation.
42
 
The situation of many women in PNG—vulnerable and lacking opportunity—
may be read as a metaphor for the society as a whole even though women 
are the ones who are most insecure.  Security of life, property and territory is 
the foundation of a thriving economy and society, and PNG has never had 
enough of it.  As the Government of PNG says, a whole-of-nation solution is 
required.  
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